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1. The context 
 
The last decade has witnessed a very fast growth of foreign direct investment (FDI) -  this both 
reflects and extends the globalization of production.  Although the greater part of FDI is still 
carried out by multinationals of one advanced country investing in another, a significant and 
perhaps increasing proportion of multinationals' investment is now taking place in developing 
countries (the South). 
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In the orthodox view, the liberalisation of trade and capital movements, and the associated 
phenomena of the globalization of markets and production, lead to a more efficient allocation of the 
world's resources and faster world growth rates
1
. Specifically in relation to Northern multinational 
investment in the South, both the North and the South are thought to gain from it.  Developing 
countries are supposed to benefit in a number of different ways, including notably the transfer of 
technology from the North to the South.  The shareholders of multinationals in the advanced 
countries ostensibly gain from the higher returns in developing countries than they  otherwise 
might earn.  The North's workers, it is suggested, benefit from the export of capital goods which 
investment by multinationals invariably involves.   
 
To consolidate the benefits of liberalization and globalization, the OECD countries are currently 
negotiating a binding multilateral agreement on investment (MAI) which would remove most of the 
remaining constraints on the free flow of FDI. Developing countries are being invited to accede to 
the final negotiated agreement -an agreement in whose formulation they will have had no say -- and 
it is possible that some Latin American countries will be early joiners.  It is expected that this will 
generate an irresistible momentum with other low income countries feeling impelled to join also.  
The OECD's objective is that the MAI should become a global policy framework, based on high 
standards with regard to the rights and treatment of FDI.   
 
The orthodox thesis on FDI has in the past been challenged by developing countries who, while 
fully recognizing certain advantages to be gained from multinational investment, have been 
concerned among other things by the enormous economic and political power of multinationals, 
their potential for monopolistic abuse and practices such as transfer pricing which reduce the net 
benefits to the country. However in the current era of liberalization and globalization, under the 
guidance and advice of the multilateral financial institutions, there has been a sea-change in the 
attitude of developing countries towards FDI.  Today these countries are competing strongly with 
one another to offer incentives to attract such investment. 
                     
1. See for example World Bank (1996); IMF (1997) 
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The main criticism of multinational investment nowadays comes from workers and the general 
public in developed countries, who attribute their high unemployment levels to the relocation of 
enterprises in low-wage developing countries and increasing competition from such countries. This 
criticism has been given academic expression by some economists who identify increased 
competition from the South, due in part to investment there by multinationals, as being a main 
cause of (a) de-industrialization, (b) growing inequality in income distribution as well as (c) 
unemployment in many Northern economies.  
 
In this overall context, this paper has the following objectives: 
 
(a) to discuss the question of technology transfer by the multinationals to developing countries and 
specifically to explore the conditions under which it is most likely to occur; 
 
(b)  to examine the validity of the theses which attribute recent observed unfavourable labour 
market outcomes in the North, i.e de-industrialization, unemployment and growing dispersion, 
largely to multinational investment and to the consequent competition from low-wage countries. 
 
(c) to examine how the proposed OECD MAI or a similar treaty would affect technology transfer to 
the South or aid the South’s development effort in other ways, and how will it affect overall welfare 
in the North. 
 
It will be argued in this paper that, on balance, the proposed OECD treaty will not be helpful either 
to countries in the South or in the North.  It is suggested that the question of FDI needs to be 
considered in relation to the overall growth of the world economy.    
 
 
2.  FDI: Recent trends  
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1.a.  There has been a very rapid growth of FDI during the last ten years or so. FDI inflow rose 
from $77.5 billion during 1983-87 to $177.3 billion in 1988-92, and to $315 billion in 1995. This 
represents an increase over the period 1985-1995 of about 400 percent in nominal US dollar terms; 
the increase was just under 200 percent in real terms (adjusted by the deflator for the OECD gross 
fixed investment). [UN,1996; WTO,1996]. 
 
1.b.  Compared with other relevant variables, the growth of FDI has also been quite fast. Between 
1980 and 1994, the ratio of FDI flows to world gross domestic capital formation doubled. The 
world gross product of foreign affiliates (a value measure of their output produced abroad) 
accounted for 6% of world GDP in 1991 (the latest year for which data are available), compared 
with 2% in 1982.  
 
1.c.  In absolute terms, as at 1993, multinational companies are estimated to have employed 73 
million people worldwide. The global sales of multinational affiliates, again worldwide, in that year 
was US$6 trillion. This compares with the value of US$4.7 trillion of goods of non-factor services 
delivered through exports. More significantly, of the latter figure, about a quarter represented 
intra-firm exports.  
 
The bulk of FDI
2
 originates in OECD countries and goes to other OECD economies: in recent 
years the approximate magnitudes are 85 per cent of all outflows and 65 per cent of all inflows, the 
USA being the major host as well as home (source) country.  
 
2. As Table 1 indicates, FDI flows to developing countries nearly doubled between 1981-1985 and 
1986-1990 from US$13 billion a year to US$ 25 billion.  The inflows more than doubled again 
over the next four years to over US 63.4 billion a year between 1991-1994. 
 
Although there are significant fluctuations, there has been a trend increase in the 1990s in 
                     
2
 95% of FDI consists of transactions between multinationals and their subsidiaries. For the purposes of this paper, FDI 
and multinational investments are synonymous. 
  
 
 6 
developing country share in total FDI inflows. The  share more than doubled between 1986-1990 
and 1991-1994, from 16% to 33.3%. However, between 1981 and 1985, the developing country 
share was 25.9% 
 
3. Most FDI flows to developing countries have been concentrated in a small number of developing 
countries.  In 1993, 81 per cent of FDI inflows went to 10 countries: China, Singapore, Argentina, 
Mexico, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Nigeria, in descending order of 
magnitude. Over the past decade, these ten countries have consistently attracted between two thirds 
and four fifths of developing country inward investment. (see UNIDO, 1996).   
 
4. Developing countries, during the last ten years, have also become important in FDI outflows. 
Between 1983 and 1987, these outflows accounted for about 5% of the  
total world outflows. The corresponding average figure for 1993-95 is about 16%, i.e. more than 
three times larger.  
 
5.Not only has there been a large trend increase in FDI flows to developing countries during the last 
ten to fifteen years, but these flows have also been subject to considerable fluctuations.  The 
fluctuations can have significant consequences for macro-economic management in these countries. 
 
 
3. Multinationals, technology transfer and economic development: analytical issues and 
evidence 
 
Analytical issues 
 
In considering the issue of technology transfer, it is useful to bear in mind the following analytical 
points:  
 
a. by saving time and resources otherwise devoted to re-inventing known technology, the transfer of 
  
 
 7 
technology from advanced industrial economies normally speeds up the industrialization of 
developing countries. 
 
b. investment by multinationals is only one way of obtaining technology: other methods include the 
import of capital goods; licensing and reverse engineering. The choice as to which method is 
adopted in any particular case depends on the specific  country circumstances and the relative cost 
of each method. 
 
c. FDI can be a relatively expensive method of obtaining technology.  This is due to the fact that 
compared with other sources of capital such as portfolio investment and long-term loans, FDI, other 
things being equal, is likely to be relatively more risky from the perspective of the investor,  Of the 
three, the form of investment which has the most certain return is long-term loans, because the 
return is fixed.  Portfolio investment and FDI have more uncertain returns, but portfolio investment 
has the advantage of being more liquid.  Consequently, investors would expect to receive a higher 
return on FDI.  So if the same technology could be obtained through FDI, the purchase of capital 
goods, or through licensing, the latter two may be less expensive.  However, if the technology is 
not the same, in that to make it fully operational it requires organisational and management skills 
which are provided by the multinationals and which can have important spill-over effects, this 
argument is less likely to apply.   To the extent that the multinational has a “monopoly” of 
knowledge over such skills, it may be able to gain 'monopoly' rents.  Whether or not the latter can 
be whittled away depends on the degree of competition from enterprises with more or less 
substitutable products also requiring similar specialised knowledge.  It will also be a function of 
the bargaining power of the host country, which  in turn will depend among other things on the 
country's level of development and the quality of its human capital resources. 
 
 
Empirical evidence 
 
With respect to empirical evidence, we concentrate here on the experience of East and South East 
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Asian countries.  This is for three reasons: 
 
i)   many of these countries have been major recipients of FDI; 
ii) they display a diversity of experience with respect to the role of FDI.  
iii)  they have been highly successful economically. 
 
 
Japan and the first tier NICs 
 
We consider first the case of  Japan and Korea.  A striking fact about these two countries in 
relation to FDI is that,  as Table 2 indicates, FDI has not been significant in quantitative terms -- its 
share in gross domestic capital formation has been and continues to be very small.  In order to 
upgrade their technological level, these countries have relied largely on imported purchases of 
capital goods and on licensing arrangements.  These were regarded as a cheaper means of 
importing particular pieces of technology than FDI. [Okimoto,1989; Chang,1996]   
 
As importantly, these countries built up a national system of technological development as part of 
their industrial policy, in order to enhance their own capacity to adapt and develop technology
3
. 
Freeman (1989) has described in detail the main components of this integrated system of national 
technological development in Japan and in Korea.  He notes, among other things, that during its 
high growth phase (1950-1973) Japan was producing relatively more engineers than the United 
States in the same period.  More recently, Korea and Taiwan have been outdoing Japan in this 
respect. Freeman suggests that one reason Korea and Japan discouraged FDI was that foreign 
multinationals would not have been so readily amenable to the system of administrative guidance in 
these countries, which was central to the implementation of their industrial policies. Furthermore, 
using the non-FDI route to achieving technology placed full responsibility for assimilating imported 
technology on domestic enterprises.   This, he argues, is far more likely to lead to “total system 
                     
3
 Frederick List had advocated such a system for Germany in the nineteenth century in order to improve its capacity to 
comete with the UK. Many of his insights remain relevent today. 
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improvements than the turn-key plant mode of import or the foreign subsidiary mode.”   
 
With respect to Korea,  UN (1993) suggests that there is a link between the national ownership of  
large firms (chaebols) and the level of investment in research and development. Korea has in 
relative terms by far the largest expenditure on R& D among developing countries -- 1.9 per cent of 
GDP in 1988, compared with 0.5 per cent for Argentina, (1988) and 0.6 for Mexico (1984)  and 
0.4  for Brazil (1985).  Korea outperformed even many developed countries in in this sphere.  
(Belgian 1.7 per cent in 1987,  Denmark 1.5 per cent in 1987 and  Italy 1.2 per cent in 1987). 
Korea’s expenditure on R&D was, of course, still below that of industrial superpowers: Japan 2.8 
per cent in 1987 and Germany also 2.8 per cent in 1987.    
 
Nevertheless, despite its relatively small magnitude, in qualitative terms, FDI has been important in 
both Korea and Japan.  It was used to develop certain key industries regarded by the authorities as 
critical to their development efforts, when this was seen to be the only means of obtaining the 
required technology
4
. FDI projects were therefore carefully screened to achieve the national 
industrial policy objectives. 
 
Turning to Taiwan, Table 2 above suggests that that as a proportion of gross domestic capital 
formation Taiwan has used relatively more FDI than Korea and Japan.  But it will be noted that 
Taiwan’s resort to FDI was well below the industrial country average.  More importantly, in 
Taiwan’s case too, FDI has been used purposefully under government guidance as part of a 
conscious effort to upgrade the technological level of the country's production and export structure. 
(Wade, 1990) 
 
The highly successful economic development of the other two countries among the first tier Asian 
NICs -- Singapore and Hong Kong -- is of limited general relevance because they are small city 
states.  Nevertheless, it is significant that these two countries followed very different policies with 
respect to FDI.  In the case of Singapore, there has been a high level of FDI, but this has been an 
                     
4
 See further Chang(1996). 
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integral part of the government's long term programme of industrial and technological upgrading.  
Hong Kong, on the other hand, attracted a large amount of FDI but this was essentially on a 
laissez-faire basis.  Lall (1996) has argued that the lack of an industrial policy has disadvantaged 
Hong Kong's industrial development. It has suffered massive de-industrialization over the last 10 
years to a much greater extent than would be expected at the colony's level of per capita income.  
Lall reports that there are now influential voices in Hong Kong calling for an industrial policy in 
order to reverse this detrimental trend. The city has so far been able to cope with this situation by its 
development of a high productivity financial services sector. This however, may not be a feasible 
strategy for larger economies since this sector is unlikely to generate sufficient foreign exchange for 
imported manufactured goods for which income elasticity tends to be very high. [See further Singh, 
1987, Rowthorn and Wells, 1987] 
 
Second tier NICS: Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand 
 
It is widely believed that these three countries have relied on large amounts of FDI for their 
development as compared with the first tier NICs.  But, as Chang 1996  has pointed out (see also 
figures in Table 2) Thailand and Indonesia, though resorting to more FDI than the first tier NICs in 
relation to gross domestic capital formation, used about the same or less than the average for 
developing countries.  Only in the case of Malaysia, has FDI been relatively much more important. 
 
 
Significantly, in all three countries FDI has been used as part of an industrial policy and has 
involved, among other things, the use of performance requirements. As Jomo and his colleagues, 
(1997) note however, the effectiveness of the industrial policy as an instrument of national 
development has been diluted in these countries at times by its use for political and rent-seeking 
ends.    
 
Although these second tier NICs have been very successful over the last fifteen years in terms of 
GDP growth, there are questions about the sustainability of their growth record. There are 
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weaknesses in their national technological systems, such that their domestic firms do not yet have a 
strong capacity to assimilate and develop technology.  This renders the countries heavily dependent 
for their technological development on continuing large inflows of FDI.  In addition, Thailand and 
Malaysia currently have  huge current account deficits which are relatively larger than even that of 
Mexico prior to the crisis in 1994.  This also makes them vulnerable to any sudden withdrawal of 
large amounts of FDI. 
 
China 
 
China has been by far the largest developing country recipient of FDI in the recent period.  
Although in the 1980s in relative terms FDI inflows into China were quite small, there has been a 
sharp quantum leap, in the 1990s.  Table 2  shows that in 1994 and 1995 FDI amounted to almost 
20 per cent of China’s gross domestic capital formation.  This figure may somewhat overestimate 
true FDI because of “round-tripping” that is, counting in FDI statistics domestic investment routed 
via a foreign country in order to seek fiscal advantages. More significantly, FDI in China differs in 
an important way from that in other developing countries.  It consists largely of capital investment 
by overseas Chinese from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan and Singapore. It is estimated that between 
1979 and 1993 Hong Kong alone accounted for nearly 70 per cent and Hong Kong and Taiwan 
together nearly 80 per cent of the total cumulative FDI during that period. The corresponding FDI 
figures for the US and Japan were by comparison, 5.4 per cent and 4.8 per cent respectively. 
 
Case studies suggest that much the larger part of overseas Chinese investment is directed towards 
technological upgrading and development.
5
 This is achieved either by the overseas Chinese 
establishing their own subsidiaries in China or more frequently by means of them establishing joint 
ventures in China with other foreign firms whose technology is sought after. To some extent, 
therefore, the overseas Chinese act as a bridge and/or intermediary with non-Chinese multinationals 
and technology providers.  
                     
5
 As Dhanin Chearavanont, the overseas Chinese chairman of Charoen Pokphand observes: "if you want to invest in 
China you must bring technology China needs. The Chinese government is not stupid. If they suspect that we were only 
there to make a profit, they would not be happy." [Vatikiotis,1997] 
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To sum up, the experience of East and South East Asian countries suggests that, in order for FDI to 
be most effectively used for technological and economic development, there are three important 
requirements
6
. First, the governments need to be selective with respect to the choice of products and 
industries in which FDI is to play a role.  Second the government must pay attention to the timing 
and phasing-in of foreign investment.  Thirdly and importantly, the best use is made of FDI when 
governments have a national technology system of the kind implemented in Japan and Korea as 
mentioned earlier. 
 
 
4.  Multinationals, Outsourcing and Competition for the North from the South 
 
Wood (1994) in an important but contentious contribution has argued that most of the recent 
unfavourable developments in the labour market in the North referred to earlier are caused largely 
by competition from the South.  Manufactured imports from the South into Northern markets have 
increased at a very fast rate in the 1980s and the 1990s, a period during which there has also been 
faster pace of de-industrialization, a large rise in unemployment and increasing inequality in the 
wages of skilled and unskilled workers.  Wood regards these latter events as being caused by the 
former.   
 
Wood himself does not deal with the question of Northern FDI in the South in great detail.  It is 
however widely believed in industrial countries that multinational investment and outsourcing in 
developing countries has been an important factor in contributing to the rapidly increasing 
competitive capacity of the South and is detrimental to the interests of the Norths workers. Thus 
Bluestone and Harrison (1982) in their influential contribution on US de-industrialisation: 'In 
                     
6
 In Latin American and Caribbean countries there is long-held view that FDI does not lead to substnatial technological 
spill-over and that often its main benefit has been to generate employment, as in the case of the maquiladora industries 
on the Mexican border with the US. Recent evidence comparing multinational investment in Mexico, Venezuela and the 
United States suggests that very low spill-overs occur in the former two countries. There is a much greater incidence in 
the United States because of the availability of the necessary human capital and infrastructure facilities. See further 
Aitken, Harrison and Lipsy(1996). 
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seeking to escape a "pro-union" or "anti-business" climate inside the United States, large 
corporations ... can build, expand, or acquire facilities outside the country altogether. In fact, all the 
strategic innovations devised by multi-plant companies for playing off one group of workers against 
another ... have become standard operating procedure in the global economy.' Similarly in a special 
report in the mid eighties Business Week bemoaned the 'hollowing' of US corporations: 'By shifting 
production overseas, US companies are whittling away at the critical mass essential to a strong 
industrial base. If globalisation of industry means that US manufacturers will wind up simply 
licking the labels and sticking them on products that are made abroad, the nation can look forward 
to a declining standard of living
7
 More recently there has been great concern in Germany with the 
phenomenon of "standortwettbewerb" (locational competition) under which German firms have 
been increasingly outsourcing production especially to eastern European countries. 
 
Wood's thesis is challenged by a number of economists on several points.  The main criticism 
levelled against his conclusions is that they are implausible because imports from the South account 
for only a small proportion of domestic demand in the North. (See Table 3)  Wood uses the same 
data to suggest that although the import penetration has been small overall, there has been a very 
rapid increase since 1978, particularly in products produced by low-skill labour.  His estimates 
suggest that imports from the South have led to a net reduction of 12 percent in manufacturing 
employment in the North.  Further, to the extent that Southern competition induces labour-saving 
technical progress in the North, Wood suggests that this may have resulted in additional job losses 
of equal magnitude.  Thus for Wood the fast growth of imports from the South, is a main cause of 
both de-industrialization and overall unemployment in industrial countries.  He also assembles 
considerable evidence to suggest that the rising inequality between skilled and unskilled workers in 
the North is due largely to Southern competition rather than technical change. 
 
 
However, in overall macro-economic terms the attribution of the large observed variations in 
manufacturing employment experienced by industrial countries during the last two decades to 
                     
7
 'The Hollow Corporation', Business Week, March 3, p.60, 1986. 
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changes in manufacturing trade with the South is problematical. Table 4 indicates that from 1970 to 
1993, manufacturing employment in the G-7 countries fell by 15 per cent, whilst there was only a 
very small decline in the North-South manufacturing trade balance.  Moreover, as UNCTAD 
(1995) notes, the timing of these losses did not systematically coincide with either a decline in the 
North’s overall trade surplus with the South or in the rise in imports from developing countries.  
Manufactured imports from developing countries into the North in fact grew more rapidly in the 
1970s than in the 1980s -- but the job losses occurred mostly in the latter decade.  Moreover, the 
main reason for the decline in the North’s manufacturing trade balance with the South in the 1980s 
was the fall in the North’s exports due to the debt crisis in the South.   
 
In contrast to the above macro-economic considerations, the important part of Woods empirical 
analysis is based on a modified Hecksher-Ohlin model and is carried out in micro-economic terms. 
He uses factor-content methodology to argue that even with balanced trade between the North and 
the South, there would be huge job losses in the North because of the differing factor intensities of 
the Norths exports and imports. 
 
On the question of wage dispersion, the mainstream view is that Wood is wrong to ascribe most of 
the increased inequity in wages to trade with the South. Woods critics concede that such trade has 
led to increased wage dispersion but suggest that no more than ten to twenty per cent of it can be 
attributed to competition from developing countries, the rest being due to the nature of technical 
change. In relation to the effects of multinationals and their outsourcing of inputs to developing 
countries, IMF(1997) summarises the available evidence as indicating that workers in the home 
("parent") country and workers employed in foreign subsidiaries either are only weak substitues for 
one another in the production process or might even be complements, so that employment tends to 
rise or fall together in the parent and subsidiaries. In either case, although there may be some 
adverse effects in some industries, it does not appear that firms have substituted foreign for 
domestic workers on a large scale. 
 
In a significant contribution Feenstra and Hanson(1996) provide a model in which outsourcing by 
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multinationals leads to increased intra-industry wage dispersion. In this model Northern firms 
respond to import competition from low wage countries by moving to them non-skill intensive 
activities. This results in a relative increase in demand for skilled labour within industries. Feenstra 
and Hanson's analysis undermines the technology hypothesis for increased wage dispersion since 
the latter is normally invoked as a 'residual' explaination after eliminatin other possible theories. In 
the mainstream contribution it has been argued that since trade can only explain inter-industry but 
not  intra-industry wage dispersion, the latter must be due to other factors such as technology. By 
linking the observed increase in the intra-industry wage dispersion in the North to multinational 
investment and southern competition,Feenstra and Hanson's research greatly weakens the 
technology hypothesis. 
 
It is not the purpose of the present paper to contibute to the debate on methodology and the details 
of the empirical analysis between Wood and the mainstream economists
8
 but rather to make a 
different kind of point.  This is that the supposed negative effects of competition from the South 
are due, in part, to the fact that overall economic growth in advanced industrial countries has been 
much slower than previously.UNCTAD(1995) provides evidence to show that in the 1950s and 
1960s there was a fast increase in import penetration of the US and other leading advanced country 
markets by products of the then newly industrialising economies, namely Italy and Japan. This rise 
in import penetration was as fast as that achieved by the late industrialisers in the advanced country 
markets in the 1980s.  Yet, in this earlier period, Northern countries sustained full employment, 
rising real wages and falling inequality in wages.  In addition, during this boom period the 
percentage of overseas workers in the labour force was increasing. 
 
An important limitation of Wood's analysis is that it is based on the traditional Hecksher-Ohlin 
model,which abstracts from aggregate demand and capital accumulation.  If a rise in real global 
demand (as a result, for instance, of better policy coordination among industrial countries) leads to a 
higher trend rate of growth of output, the negative impact of Southern competition on unskilled 
                     
8
There is voluminous literature on this subject. Significant contributions include Lawrence and Slaughter(1993); Sachs 
and Shutz(1994); Neven and Wyplosz(1996); Leamer(1996). 
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workers in the North may be more than outweighed by what Bhagwati calls the lift-all-boats effect 
of faster overall growth.  In this scenario unskilled labour shifts from manufacturing to non-traded 
services.Singh(1995). Therefore, even if Wood is wholly correct in his argument and all the 
underlying economic processes to which he refers operate in the way he describes, faster economic 
growth in the North could over-ride their negative impact.   
 
 
5.  The OECD's multilateral agreement on Investment (MAI) 
 
The OECD countries -- the major host and home countries for FDI -- are working to establish a 
comprehensive investment agreement among themselves.  Briefly, the aim is to establish a binding 
treaty outside of the WTO framework.  This will subject foreign investment to a regime which 
removes all or most of the remaining restrictions on FDI.  It will also ensure that FDI is treated by 
national authorities no differently from domestic investment.  In brief, the proposed regime would 
be based on the following principles. 
 
-  the right of establishment for foreign investors; 
 
-  the principle of "most favoured nation" (mfn) treatment; 
 
-  the principle of "national treatment"; 
 
-  investment protection, including matters relating to       
   expropriation and the transfer of capital; 
 
-  additional disciplines relating to, among other matters:  
   entry, stay and work of key personnel; 
 
-  performance requirements imposed by host governments on       
  
 
 17 
   foreign investors in order to secure economic benefits for 
         the country as a whole; 
 
-  rules on investment incentives; 
 
-  binding rules for settling disputes. 
 
There is consensus within the OECD on a single broad definition of investment, which goes 
"beyond the traditional notion of FDI to cover virtually all tangible and intangible assets, and which 
applies to both pre-establishment and post-establishment (OECD, 1997)."  The definition therefore 
embraces intellectual property and portfolio investment. 
 
As noted in the introduction, the OECD's evident intention is to make the MAI eventually into a 
universal treaty.  If this were to happen, what would be its impact on developing and developed 
countries?  We briefly examine these topics in turn below. 
 
MAI and developing countries 
 
It is clear from the discussion in section 3 that, to gain the maximum benefit from FDI, it is 
important for countries to be selective with respect to FDI and for them to have an integrated 
industrial and technology development policy.  Therefore from the perspective of achieving 
technological development in developing countries a regime of free capital flows would be a 
retrograde step.  It will prevent these countries from being selective with respect to either projects 
or phasing.  Furthermore the OECD's MAI proposes to proscribe a number of national industrial 
policy measures such as performance requirements.  Indeed the intention is to make the rules in 
this respect even more stringent that those agreed in the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures. 
 
It is sometimes suggested that although developing countries may not be able to be selective as a 
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consequence of a treaty of this nature they may nevertheless attract more FDI under such a regime.  
Several points may be made in response. 
 
Firstly, the large trend increase in FDI to developing countries in the recent period has occurred 
without any such treaty.  Apparently, the existing bilateral treaties between developed and 
developing countries are regarded as providing adequate protection by multinational investors - for 
those countries where there are good economic reasons for FDI in any case.  Secondly, there are 
many countries, particularly in Africa, which have attracted little multinational investment even 
though they have introduced on the whole extremely liberal regimes with respect to FDI.  Thirdly, 
to the extent that FDI inflows may occur in surges which under a global MAI, developing countries 
will not be able to regulate, there will be greater instability in the host country economy which is 
likely to make it less attractive to FDI. 
 
MAI and developed countries 
 
Turning to advanced countries, will these countries benefit from unfettered FDI?  There are 
important considerations which suggest that the net impact on advanced countries may be negative 
rather than positive. 
 
 
As noted earlier, the first best solution to the North's labour market problems, including those 
arising from actual or potential competition from the South lies in achieving a large trend increase 
in the rate of economic growth such that prevailed in these countries in the 1950s and 1960s.  
Singh (1997a, 1997b) provides detailed analysis and evidence to suggest that the present liberal 
global regime of more or less free trade and capital movements is unlikely to be successful in such 
an endeavour.  Very briefly, the essential arguments of these papers can be summarized as follows: 
 
1.  That advanced economies have basically operated under such a regime for about the last fifteen 
years.  Their performance in terms of either output or productivity growth has been less than 
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impressive.  The trend rate of OECD GDP growth during this period has been approximately half 
of what it was during the illiberal 1950s and 1960s.  The most important failure of the current 
market supremacist regime lies of course in the existence of mass unemployment in many industrial 
countries today, whereas there was more or less full employment in the earlier period. 
 
2.  That the failures of the current regime are not due to exogenous factors but are intrinsic to the 
regime itself.  Free capital movements and the supremacy of the financial markets in a variety of 
ways make it difficult to attain a high rate of growth of real demand in the world economy. 
 
3.  The central constraint on fast economic growth in the world economy does not lie on the supply 
side.  Not only are there unutilized human resources, but also, significantly, there is a huge backlog 
of technology.  The information and technological communications revolution is regarded by 
leading scholars on the subject as equivalent in its potential to that of steam engines and electricity.  
But its full potential has not as yet been realized because of insufficient growth of demand. 
 
The central constraint on fast economic growth is therefore not failure on the supply side but that on 
the demand side.  To that extent, it is a self-inflicted wound arising from the failure of coordinating 
economic mechanisms. 
 
To the extent that all that MAI will do will be to accentuate such a regime, the prospects are of 
continuing slow growth of the OECD economies.  With such slow growth, the negative aspects of 
Southern competition on the North's labour market will become progressively more pronounced, 
particularly as countries like China and India fully enter the global marketplace. 
 
The North's workers, particularly the unskilled, will be the real losers.  Apart from the effects of 
slow growth they will also be disadvantaged through another channel.  Workers will be obliged to 
bear the full burden of terms of trade shocks to an economy to the extent that mobility of capital 
will promote a risk-adjusted world rate of return and therefore narrow the range of variations of 
returns to capital within a country.  With greater inflexibility in rates of return, skilled and 
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unskilled workers will have to absorb more of the impact of any product  price changes.  This will 
either be reflected in greater volatility and dispersion of workers earnings or greater unemployment, 
depending on the country's labour market institutions.
9
 
 
In conclusion, an essential argument of this paper is that in order to permit developing countries to 
reap the full benefits of FDI for their technological development, it is necessary for them to retain 
their current options of selectivity in determining the form and composition of capital flows.  From 
the perspective of workers in advanced countries, what is required is not restrictions on FDI, but 
rather faster rates of economic growth. 
 
The salient question is whether a faster growth of real demand, output and productivity is feasible 
in the world economy today under any reasonable set of policies.  Or, is it simply the case that 
there is no viable alternative to liberalisation and globalisation as the Bretton Woods Institutions 
insist?  It was suggested in Singh (1995) that there does exist an alternative policy programme, but 
this would involve a decisive move away from the present market supremacist model towards one 
based on social consensus between as well as within countries.  However, in order to obtain a trend 
increase in the rate of growth of real demand (rather than simply money demand) in the OECD 
countries, new institutions and institutional mechanisms would be necessary both at the national 
and international levels.  These are required to achieve international macro-economic policy 
coordination and to maintain wage-price restraint during the growth process.
10
   
 
                     
9
  It may be argued that FDI flows are also relatively immobile because they represent bricks and mortar.  This is, 
however, less and less valid in a world of derivatives and ever-increasing ingenuity of financial markets.  The MAI, by 
covering FDI as well as portfolio flows, will make all investment more liquid and all would be hedged to some extent. 
10
  These institutional changes were analyzed and examined at length in Singh (1995).  Very briefly, what is required at 
the international level is for governments to agree to (a) give chief priority to the employment problem; (b) symmetrical 
adjustment in deficit and surplus countries; (c) macro-economic policy coordination particularly between industrial 
countries via a multilateral mechanism.  Originally this was the intended role of the IMF, instead of which it has mostly 
been used to discipline the South. 
 Parallel to these external coordinating mechanisms, it is also necessary to have appropriate national pay 
coordinating mechanisms in industrial countries, rather than policies of labour market flexibility and deregulation.  Such 
incomes policies only work, however, if they are not seen simply as a mechanism to reduce workers' real wages but are 
regarded as fair and redistributive in a progressive direction.  Indeed, James Meade regarded these internal mechanisms 
in leading industrial countries to be more important than external ones. 
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